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HOMASSON’S EASY ONTOLOGY APPROACH (2015) aims at deflating 
existence questions through a revival of Carnap’s (1950) distinction 
between internal and external questions. Importantly, her account 
depends on an analysis of the ordinary meaning of ‘exist(s)’ as a second-order 
predicate. I do two things in this paper. First, I show that Thomasson’s analysis 
fails to do justice to the complexity of the English predicate ‘exist(s)’. Against 
Thomasson, I argue that there are cases in which ‘exist(s)’ functions as a first-
order predicate. Because these cases were first noted by P.F. Strawson (1967), I 
will call them ‘Strawson-cases’. Secondly, I argue that these counterexamples give 
some support to (i) more substantive theories about existence as well as (ii) 
accounts that treat ‘exist(s)’ as varying in meaning. 
 
§2. Easy Ontology 
Thomasson’s easy ontology approach centres around Carnap’s distinction 
between internal and external questions, which she elucidates in terms of a 
use/mention distinction (Thomasson 2015: 36-45; see Price 2009 as well). Internal 
questions are questions where the relevant term (for example ‘proposition’, 
‘number’, ‘electron’ in questions such as ‘Do propositions exist?’, ‘Do numbers 
exist?’ or ‘Do electrons exist’?) is used, which means that the term is governed by 
the standard rules of use that make them part of the linguistic framework in 
which these terms are introduced in the first place. An external question is a 
question where the term is not governed by its standard rules of use but only 
mentioned. An external question in which the term is not governed by its standard 
rules of use is either (1) meaningless, or (2) must be (more charitably) 
interpreted as a proposal to adopt a new set of rules. Because internal questions 
can be answered by straightforward conceptual or empirical means, the 
metaphysician (who does not treat these existence questions as settled in such a 
T 
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straightforward manner) must be asking the question (‘Do propositions exist?’, 
‘Do numbers exist?’, ‘Do electrons exist?’) in a different (external) sense. 
According to Thomasson’s Carnapian framework, such questions should be 
regarded as meaningless, or as revisionary proposals to change the rules of use of 
the relevant term. 
What are the rules of use that govern the terms that appear in existence 
questions? Thomasson characterizes them as ‘application conditions’ (or 
‘conditions of application’). These amount to the semantic rules that govern our 
terms and are implicitly mastered by competent speakers of a language. 
Thomasson takes these rules to be constitutive of the meaning of linguistic 
expressions.1 These application conditions can be fulfilled either (i) when certain 
empirical conditions obtain or (ii) when a particular statement analytically entails 
the introduction of the relevant term. Thomasson proposes the following 
equivalence schema that explicitly states the rule of use for the English ‘exist(s)’ 
(Thomasson 2015: 86): 
 
[E] Ks exist iff the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’ are 
fulfilled. 
 
While this equivalence schema might seem trivial, Thomasson (2015: 116) is 
aware that her endorsement of [E] excludes theories that defend more 
substantive criteria for ‘exist(s)’, such as Armstrong’s ‘Eleatic criterion’ (which 
holds that what exists must make a causal difference; see Armstrong 1997: 41) or 
accounts that take mind-independence to be a criterion for existence.2 Following 
a tradition which includes philosophers such as Gassendi, Hume, Kant and Frege, 
Thomasson’s equivalence schema gives a purely formal criterion for existence. On 
this account, the grammatical predicate ‘exist(s)’ does not ‘add’ anything to the 
subject to which it is predicated (and therefore does not function as a ‘real’, a 
‘logical’ or a ‘first-order’ predicate). In Thomasson’s terminology, this amounts 
to saying that ‘exist(s)’ does not come with its own application conditions, but 
rather has the function of affirming that the application conditions associated 
with the subject-expression (‘K’) are instantiated. Therefore, the deflationist can 
 
1  Not only application conditions are constitutive of the meaning of a term, however. Thomasson (2015: 
89-90n4, 223) also includes co-application conditions and exit rules (consequences of application) 
among the rules that constitute meaning. 
2  Similarly, deflationary accounts of truth adhere to the equivalence schema ‘<p> is true if and only if p’ 
and argue that this is all that can be said about the meaning of ‘… is true’. By doing so, they exclude more 
substantive theories of truth such as correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist theories of truth. 
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accept that there are differences between saying that ‘Horses exist’ and saying 
that ‘Numbers exist’. The difference between those claims does not derive from 
an ambiguity of ‘exist(s)’ but from the difference between the term ‘horses’ 
(which has spatio-temporal connotations) and the term ‘numbers’ (which does 
not have spatio-temporal connotations). Despite Thomasson’s opposition to neo-
Quinean hard metaphysicians, Thomasson is in good company in this regard, as 
Quine made exactly the same point in his classic essay ‘On What There Is’:3 
 
If Pegasus existed he would indeed be in space and time, but only because the word 
‘Pegasus’ has spatio-temporal connotations, and not because ‘exist’ has spatio-temporal 
connotations. If spatio-temporal reference is lacking when we affirm the existence of the 
cube root of 27, this is simply because a cube root is not a spatio-temporal kind of thing, 
and not because we are being ambiguous in our use of ‘exist’. (Quine 1948: 23) 
 
Thomasson is not only aware that [E] excludes more substantive theories about 
existence. She also states that her account differs from another prominent 
deflationary approach in the literature. Contrary to Hirsch’s (2011) quantifier 
variance view (which draws inspiration from Putnam), Thomasson’s easy 
ontology does not hold that ‘exist(s)’ varies in meaning when uttered by different 
speakers. This is an important difference. Before Thomasson’s easy ontology 
approach, neo-Carnapian deflationism and quantifier variance were practically 
treated as amounting to the same thing. One of the merits of Thomasson’s easy 
ontology approach is exactly to show how one can be a meta-ontological 
deflationist and still endorse the idea that ‘exist(s)’ is a univocal, formal term.  
 
§3. Strawson-cases 
Thomasson explicitly acknowledges (2015: 44) that she diverges from Carnap in 
the sense that Carnap is primarily occupied with formal languages and that she 
focuses on the ordinary meaning of the English ‘exist(s)’. However, Thomasson’s 
analysis fails to do justice to the complexity of ‘exist(s)’. As I will now show, there 
are cases in which ‘exist(s)’ functions as a first-order predicate. 
In his often neglected 1967 paper ‘Is Existence Never A Predicate?’, P.F. 
Strawson first gives some support for the idea that ‘exist(s)’ behaves as a second-
order predicate in some ordinary contexts, but then goes on to show that there 
are ordinary cases in which ‘exist(s)’ behaves as a first-order predicate. In 
 
3  This should not come as a surprise, as Thomasson (2015: 45-56) criticizes the historical accuracy of 
Quine as a champion of traditional metaphysics. 
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supporting the theory, he uses an example that was developed by G.E. Moore 
(1936). The example concerns the different behaviour of the sentences 
 
(1) Tame tigers growl; and 
(2) Tame tigers exist, 
 
when they are embedded in constructions with quantifying adjectives such as no, 
at least one, a few, some, many, most or all. The difference between (1) and (2) is 
that, whereas (1) can be embedded without any problems in constructions with 
all such quantifying adjectives, embedding (2) is possible only in constructions 
with quantifying adjectives such as no, at least one, a few, some and many but not in 
constructions with quantifying adjectives such as most and all. Whereas it makes 
sense to say that All tame tigers growl or that Most tame tigers growl, it would be rather 
peculiar to say that All tame tigers exist or Most tame tigers exist. Strawson’s 
explanation for this difference between ‘growl’ and ‘exist’ is that, while both 
clearly function as grammatical predicates, the functional or logical role of the 
two grammatical predicates differ. ‘Growl’ functions as a logical (or first-order) 
predicate because the role of ‘growl’ is to make a distinction within a presupposed 
class of tame tigers, between those tame tigers that growl and those that do not 
growl. ‘Exist’, on the other hand, does not make a distinction between members 
that do and members that do not exhibit a particular property within a 
presupposed class of tame tigers. Instead, the use of ‘exist’ is to assert that the 
concept of tame tigers is instantiated (or, in Thomasson’s words, to state that the 
application conditions for ‘tame tigers’ are fulfilled). The quantifying adjectives 
then do not mark how many members of a presupposed class exhibits a particular 
property, but rather marks the size of the class of members. Because such a 
function can only be fulfilled in a construction with quantifying adjectives such 
as no, at least one, a few, some and many but not in a construction with quantifying 
adjectives such as most or all, the use of ‘exist’ in constructions with most or all 
(‘Most tigers exist’ and ‘All tigers exist’) does not seem to make much sense. 
This data gives support to Thomasson’s analysis of the ordinary behaviour of 
the English ‘exist(s)’ as a second-order predicate. But there are counterexamples 
as well. Consider the following two cases based on Strawson’s original cases (1967: 
13): 
 
[SC1] Rebecca is overhearing a conversation a group of people is having. This group of 
people is talking about a number of characters (‘Frances’, ‘Melissa’, ‘Bobbi’, and ‘Nick’) 
Rebecca remembers from a recent novel she read by Sally Rooney. Because she does not 
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recognize all characters the speakers are talking about, Rebecca intervenes and says: “I know 
who Frances, Melissa, Bobbi and Nick are, but what stories do these other characters come 
in?” And to this she receives the unexpected reply: “They don’t come in any stories. All the 
people we’re talking about exist.” 
[SC2] Luna is looking at the drawings in a children’s book. The book contains a lot of 
creatures that she has never seen before. Luna’s father tells her: “There are a few creatures 
that are invented by the author, but most of them existed.” 
 
One could imagine a similar situation in which the answer would be that Some of 
the people we’re talking about exist or that All of the creatures in the book existed. 
Importantly, [SC1] and [SC2] describe ordinary cases in which ‘exist(s)’ is 
properly used in a construction involving the quantifying adjectives most and all. 
But unlike the other quantifying adjectives, most and all only appear in contexts 
in which the speaker marks how many members of a presupposed class exhibit a 
particular property. To use one of Strawson’s own metaphors, constructions with 
these two quantifying adjectives are used to fill strokes within a circle (a metaphor 
for what one is doing when using a first-order predicate), but cannot be used to 
draw a big or small circle (a metaphor for what one is doing when using a second-
order predicate). And, indeed, in [SC1] and [SC2] the speaker informatively 
ascribes some substantial property to (i) a set of characters being talked about 
(in the case of [SC1]), and (ii) a set of creatures that feature in the book (in the  
case of [SC2]). In [SC1], the assertion that All of the people we’re talking about exist 
informs us that the people talked about can be encountered in real life, which has as 
its consequence that we can shake their hands, have a drink with them, call them 
on their phones etc. Similarly, in [SC2], the assertion that Most of the creatures in 
the book existed informs us that there was a time in which we could encounter these 
creatures in real life, i.e. a time in which we could have perceived, touched them, 
or could have run from them in more dangerous situations. The use of ‘exist(s)’ 
here is exactly to describe these beings as spatio-temporally locatable entities that 
can be touched and perceived, which distinguishes them from merely fictional 
characters whose hands we cannot shake, whom we cannot call on the phone etc. 
In these cases, to ascribe existence is a difference that makes a difference. The use 
of ‘exist(s)’ is here exactly to state that the people discussed (in [SC1]) or the 
creatures described (in [SC2]) are not just fictional characters or mythological 
creatures, but rather actual people or things we might encounter in real life. 
 
§4. Consequences 
These counterexamples show two important things, each with its own 
implications. First, that Thomasson fails to exclude more substantive theories 
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about existence on the basis of the ordinary meaning of ‘exist(s)’. Such 
substantive theories defend criteria for ‘exist(s)’ such as mind-independence or 
the making of a causal difference. While ‘mind-independence’ and ‘the making 
of a causal difference’ are definitely in need of further explications, the Strawson-
cases show that the intuition behind such theories is not simply a departure from 
the ordinary behaviour of ‘exist(s)’ in certain contexts, but is actually rooted in 
it. In [SC1] and [SC2], it is plausible that something akin to these (more 
substantive) criteria indeed govern the use of ‘exist(s)’. Of course, to make this 
point is not to deny that there are many contexts in which ‘exists(s)’ is most 
plausibly understood as a second-order predicate which does not ‘add’ anything 
to the subject. The point is simply that, if the more substantive theorist cares 
about the actual behaviour of ‘exist(s)’ at all, there is some data that her more 
substantive theory has roots in the actual behaviour of ‘exist(s)’. 
Secondly, the Strawson-cases could be used to give some support for the idea 
that ‘exist(s)’ varies in meaning in different contexts. Given Thomasson’s own 
characterization of the rules of use of English terms as constitutive for the 
meaning of these terms, it could be argued that ‘exist(s)’ is governed by different 
rules of use in different contexts, and therefore that it varies in meaning in these 
different contexts. As is shown by the difference between the behaviour of ‘Tame 
tigers growl’ and ‘Tame tigers exist’ in constructions with quantifying adjectives, 
there is clear data showing that ‘exist(s)’ indeed functions as a second-order 
predicate in many cases. In such contexts, Thomasson’s equivalence schema 
perfectly captures the rule of use for ‘exist(s)’. But, as the Strawson-cases show, 
the data is not as unified as Thomasson’s equivalence schema would imply. In 
such cases, a more substantive rule governs our use of ‘exist(s)’. If one endorses 
Thomasson’s claim that the rules of use are constitutive of the meaning of 
‘exist(s)’, one should conclude that the ordinary English ‘exist(s)’ varies in 
meaning as well. As always, the behaviour of our everyday expressions is 
multifaceted and quite rich. As opposed to formal languages, “ordinary language 
has no exact logic.” (Strawson 1950: 344) 
 
§5. Conclusion 
Thomasson’s easy ontology approach depends on an analysis of the ordinary 
meaning of the English ‘exist(s)’ as a second-order predicate. In this paper, I 
have argued that the so-called ‘Strawson-cases’ show that Thomasson’s analysis 
fails to do justice to the complexity of the ordinary behaviour of ‘exist(s)’. I also 
argued that these counterexamples give some support to (i) more substantive 
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theories about existence as well as (ii) accounts that treat ‘exist(s)’ as varying in 
meaning. As Strawson put it: 
 
Must we suppose that at least and at most one model will fit each case? I am inclined to 
think that we take our models too seriously, if we suppose this, and have too little regard for 
the pleasant fluidities of thinking. (Strawson 1967: 15). 
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A problem for easy ontology 
Thomasson’s easy ontology approach (2015) aims at deflating existence questions through a revival of 
Carnap’s (1950) distinction between internal and external questions. Importantly, her account depends on 
an analysis of the ordinary meaning of ‘exist(s)’ as a second-order predicate. I do two things in this paper. 
First, I show that Thomasson’s analysis fails to do justice to the complexity of the English predicate ‘exist(s)’. 
Against Thomasson, I argue that there are cases in which ‘exist(s)’ functions as a first-order predicate. Because 
these cases were first noted by P.F. Strawson (1967), I will call them ‘Strawson-cases’. Secondly, I argue that 
these counterexamples give some support to (i) more substantive theories about existence as well as (ii) 
accounts that treat ‘exist(s)’ as varying in meaning.  
Keywords: Ontology  Existence  Carnap  Strawson.  
 
Un problema para la ontología fácil 
El enfoque de ontología fácil de Thomasson (2015) tiene como objetivo desinflar las preguntas de la existencia 
a través de un resurgimiento de la distinción de Carnap (1950) entre preguntas internas y externas. Es 
importante destacar que su explicación depende de un análisis del significado ordinario de "existen(n)" como 
un predicado de segundo orden. Hago dos cosas en este papel. Primero, muestro que el análisis de Thomasson 
no hace justicia a la complejidad del predicado en inglés "existe(n)". Contra Thomasson, sostengo que hay 
casos en los que "existe (s)" funciona como un predicado de primer orden. Debido a que estos casos fueron 
notados por primera vez por P.F. Strawson (1967), los llamaré "casos de Strawson". En segundo lugar, 
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sostengo que estos contraejemplos dan cierto apoyo a (i) teorías más sustantivas sobre la existencia, así como 
a (ii) explicaciones que tratan "existe(n)" como de significado variable.  
Palabras Clave: Ontología  Existencia  Carnap  Strawson.  
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